作为价值投资的奠基者之一，巴菲特的投资或商业举动往往都能引发市场的关注。即使并未持有伯克希尔的股票，仍然可以在信中寻找巴菲特对经济环境的洞察、市场时机的选择、商业评估，以及股票标的的选择。以下内容是节选自《致股东信》（Berkshire Annual letter）：

【关注本公众号，在后台回复“巴菲特”，即可获取《致股东信》（英文原版）】

根据通用会计准则（GAAP），伯克希尔在2018年赚了40亿美元，其中营业利润248亿，非现金流损失30亿（来自卡夫亨氏的商誉减值），出售投资证券所获资本利得28亿，投资组合浮亏206亿。

Berkshire earned $4.0 billion in 2018 utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (commonly called“GAAP”). The components of that figure are $24.8 billion in operating earnings, a $3.0 billion non-cash loss from an impairment of intangible assets (arising almost entirely from our equity interest in Kraft Heinz), $2.8 billion in realized capital gains from the sale of investment securities and a $20.6 billion loss from a reduction in the amount of unrealized capital gains that existed in our investment holdings.

新的会计准则要求我们在利润中包含最后一项。 正如我在2017年年度报告中强调的那样，查理跟我都觉得这个规则很没有道理。 相反，我们俩都一直认为，在伯克希尔，这种按市值计价的变化会导致“我们的净利润出现剧烈而反复无常的波动”。

A new GAAP rule requires us to include that last item in earnings. As I emphasized in the 2017 annual report, neither Berkshire’s Vice Chairman, Charlie Munger, nor I believe that rule to be sensible. Rather, both of us have consistently thought that at Berkshire this mark-to-market change would produce what I described as “wild and capricious swings in our bottom line.”

我们的建议？别管太多，只要看我们的经营利润就好了。我这么说的意思并不是说我们的投资组合不重要。长期看，查理跟我认为投资组合会带来显著收益，只是时间上存在高度的不确定性。

Our advice? Focus on operating earnings, paying little attention to gains or losses of any variety. My saying that in no way diminishes the importance of our investments to Berkshire. Over time, Charlie and I expect them to deliver substantial gains, albeit with highly irregular timing.

我们年报的老读者们将会发现我写这封信的顺序有些不大一样。过去三十年，第一段总是讲伯克希尔每股账面价值的增长率。现在是时候摒弃这项传统了。事实上，第二页上显示的伯克希尔每年账面价值的变动已经失去了往昔的意义，有三个方面的因素。第一，伯克希尔已从以持有证券资产为主的公司逐渐转变为依靠旗下企业运营产生价值的公司，查理跟我认为这种转变还将不同程度的持续。第二，尽管股票是以市值记账，但我们持有的非上市企业都是以远低当前价值的账面价值记账，这几年这种错误日益加重。第三，有可能未来伯克希尔会在以股价高于账面价但是低于内在价值的情况下大量回购股票，从而造成每股的内在价值增长而账面价值降低。以上就造成账面价值这个指标越来越偏离经济价值。这种收购的数学原理很简单：每笔收购都使每股内在价值上升，而每股账面价值下降。两者结合将导致账面价值越来越脱离经济现实。

Long-time readers of our annual reports will have spotted the different way in which I opened this letter. For nearly three decades, the initial paragraph featured the percentage change in Berkshire’s per-share book value. It’s now time to abandon that practice.The fact is that the annual change in Berkshire’s book value – which makes its farewell appearance on page 2 – is a metric that has lost the relevance it once had. Three circumstances have made that so. First, Berkshire has gradually morphed from a company whose assets are concentrated in marketable stocks into one whose major value resides in operating businesses. Charlie and I expect that reshaping to continue in an irregular manner. Second, while our equity holdings are valued at market prices, accounting rules require our collection of operating companies to be included in book value at an amount far below their current value, a mismark that has grown in recent years. Third, it is likely that – over time – Berkshire will be a significant re-purchaser of its shares, transactions that will take place at prices above book value but below our estimate of intrinsic value. The math of such purchases is simple: Each transaction makes per-share intrinsic value go up, while per-share book value goes down. That combination causes the book-value scorecard to become increasingly out of touch with economic reality.

在未来的财务业绩表中，我们期望关注伯克希尔的市场价格。市场可能非常反复无常：只需看看第2页列出的54年历史业绩便知。然而，随着时间的推移，伯克希尔的股价将提供最佳的业绩衡量标准。

In future tabulations of our financial results, we expect to focus on Berkshire’s market price. Markets can be extremely capricious: Just look at the 54-year history laid out on page 2. Over time, however, Berkshire’s stock price will provide the best measure of business performance.

投资者在评估伯克希尔时，有时候会过度关注我们众多不同业务的细节，也就是我们所谓的“树木”。由于我们有大量不同的样本——从细嫩枝条到参天巨木，分析这些样本会让人头脑发麻。我们的有些树木可能罹患疾病，可能撑不过10年了。而其他一些树木，必将成长得高大健美。 

Investors who evaluate Berkshire sometimes obsess on the details of our many and diverse businesses – our economic “trees,” so to speak. Analysis of that type can be mind-numbing, given that we own a vast array of specimens, ranging from twigs to redwoods. A few of our trees are diseased and unlikely to be around a decade from now. Many others, though, are destined to grow in size and beauty.

幸运的是，想要粗略估计伯克希尔的内在商业价值，没有必要单独去评估每一棵树。那是因为我们的森林包含五个重要的“树林”，每个树林都可以相当准确地进行整体评估。其中四个树林是按照不同的业务和金融资产划分的集群，这样很容易理解。第五个树林——即我们庞大而多样化的保险业务——以不太明显的方式为伯克希尔提供了巨大的价值，我将在本函后面解释。 

Fortunately, it’s not necessary to evaluate each tree individually to make a rough estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic business value. That’s because our forest contains five “groves” of major importance, each of which can be appraised, with reasonable accuracy, in its entirety. Four of those groves are differentiated clusters of businesses and financial assets that are easy to understand. The fifth – our huge and diverse insurance operation – delivers great value to Berkshire in a less obvious manner, one I will explain later in this letter.

一个关键且持久的要点是：伯克希尔通过将五类资产整合成一个实体来实现价值最大化。这种安排使我们能够无缝、客观地配置大量资金，消除企业风险，避免孤立，以极低成本为资产提供资金，偶尔利用税收效益，并将管理费用降至最低。 

Finally, a point of key and lasting importance: Berkshire’s value is maximized by our having assembled the five groves into a single entity. This arrangement allows us to seamlessly and objectively allocate major amounts of capital, eliminate enterprise risk, avoid insularity, fund assets at exceptionally low cost, occasionally take advantage of tax efficiencies, and minimize overhead.

在伯克希尔，整体效益大于其实是远大于各部分之和。 

At Berkshire, the whole is greater – considerably greater – than the sum of the parts.

之前我提到过伯克希尔会时不时地回购自己的股票。假设我们以低于伯克希尔内在价值的价格购买股票（这肯定是我们的意图），回购将对那些即将离开公司的股东和留下来的股东都有利。 

Earlier I mentioned that Berkshire will from time to time be repurchasing its own stock. Assuming that we buy at a discount to Berkshire’s intrinsic value – which certainly will be our intention – repurchases will benefit both those shareholders leaving the company and those who stay.

当一家公司说它在考虑回购时，至关重要的是，所有股东-合作伙伴都能获得他们需要的信息，以便对其价值做出明智的评估。提供这些信息是我和查理在这份报告中正在试图做的。我们不希望合伙人因为被误导或信息不充分而将股份卖回公司。 

When a company says that it contemplates repurchases, it’s vital that all shareholder-partners be given the information they need to make an intelligent estimate of value. Providing that information is what Charlie and I try to do in this report. We do not want a partner to sell shares back to the company because he or she has been misled or inadequately informed. 

我们被财产/意外伤害（P/C）保险业务吸引的原因之一是该行业的商业模式：P/C保险公司预先收取保险费，然后支付索赔金。在极端情况下，如接触石棉或严重工作场所事故所引起的索赔，付款可能会持续数十年。

One reason we were attracted to the P/C business was the industry’s business model: P/C insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as claims arising from exposure to asbestos, or severe workplace accidents, payments can stretch over many decades.

这种现在收钱、以后付款的模式使得P/C公司能持有大量资金，我们称之为“浮存资金”- 最终将流向其他公司。与此同时，保险公司为了自己的利益，可以将这些浮存资金进行投资。尽管个别保单和索赔会来来去去，但保险公司持有的浮存资金通常相对于保费数额而言相当稳定。因此，随着业务发展，我们的浮存资金也随之增长。

This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums – money we call “float” – that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their own benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume. Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float.

我们可能迟早会经历浮存资金的下降，如果这样，这种下降也将是非常缓慢的，从外部看，任何一年都不会超过3%。我们保险合同的性质使我们永远不可能受制于对我们现金资源具有重要意义款项的即期或短期要求。这种结构是经过设计的，是我们保险公司无与伦比的财务实力的重要组成部分。这种力量永远不会被削弱。

We may in time experience a decline in float. If so, the decline will be very gradual – at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate or nearterm demands for sums that are of significance to our cash resources. That structure is by design and is a key component in the unequaled financial strength of our insurance companies. That strength will never be compromised.

除了使用债务和股票，伯克希尔还从两种不太常见的融资渠道中获得了重大利益。较大的是我所描述的浮存资金。到目前为止，尽管这些基金在我们的资产负债表上被记录为一个巨大的可变现资产，但它们对我们产生的效用大于同等数量的股本。这是因为它们通常伴随着承保收益。实际上，我们多年来一直因为持有和使用他人的钱而获得收益。

Beyond using debt and equity, Berkshire has benefited in a major way from two less-common sources of corporate funding. The larger is the float I have described. So far, those funds, though they are recorded as a huge net liability on our balance sheet, have been of more utility to us than an equivalent amount of equity. That’s because they have usually been accompanied by underwriting earnings. In effect, we have been paid in most years for holding and using other people’s money.

根据我的估计，托尼对GEICO的管理使伯克希尔的内在价值增加了500多亿美元。最重要的是，作为一个管理者，从任何角度看他都是一个榜样他帮助他的4万名员工发现并开发出他们一直没意识到的能力。

By my estimate, Tony’s management of GEICO has increased Berkshire’s intrinsic value by more than $50 billion. On top of that, he is a model for everything a manager should be, helping his 40,000 associates to identify and polish abilities they didn’t realize they possessed.

去年，托尼决定辞去CEO一职。6月30日，他把这个职位移交给他的长期合作伙伴比尔-罗伯茨（Bill Roberts）。我认识比尔并看着他工作了几十年，托尼再一次做出了正确的决定。托尼仍是GEICO的董事长，他在余生都会尽心尽力帮助GEICO，他没法不这样做。

Last year, Tony decided to retire as CEO, and on June 30th he turned that position over to Bill Roberts, his long-time partner. I’ve known and watched Bill operate for several decades, and once again Tony made the right move. Tony remains Chairman and will be helpful to GEICO for the rest of his life. He’s incapable of doing less.

所有伯克希尔的股东都应该感谢托尼，尤其是我。

All Berkshire shareholders owe Tony their thanks. I head the list.

1788年——回到我们的起点——除了一小群雄心勃勃的人，以及一个旨在将他们的梦想变成现实的、尚处萌芽状态的治理框架之外，真的没有什么特别的。今天，美联储估计我们的家庭财富为108万亿美元，这个数字规模高到几乎让人难以理解。

In 1788 – to go back to our starting point – there really wasn’t much here except for a small band of ambitious people and an embryonic governing framework aimed at turning their dreams into reality. Today, the Federal Reserve estimates our household wealth at $108 trillion, an amount almost impossible to comprehend.

查理和我高兴地承认，伯克希尔的成功在很大程度上只是我认为应该被称为“美国顺风”的产物。对于美国企业或个人来说，吹嘘自己“单枪匹马就完成了这一切”已不能用傲慢来形容。在诺曼底整齐排列的简单白色十字架应该让那些做出如此声明的人感到羞愧。

Charlie and I happily acknowledge that much of Berkshire’s success has simply been a product of what I think should be called The American Tailwind. It is beyond arrogance for American businesses or individuals to boast that they have “done it alone.” The tidy rows of simple white crosses at Normandy should shame those who make such claims.

世界上还有许多其他国家有着光明的前途。关于这一点，我们应该感到高兴：如果所有的国家繁荣，美国将更加繁荣，也将更加安全。在伯克希尔哈撒韦，我们希望在海外大举投资。

There are also many other countries around the world that have bright futures. About that, we should rejoice: Americans will be both more prosperous and safer if all nations thrive. At Berkshire, we hope to invest significant sums across borders.

然而，在未来的77年里，我们的主要收益几乎肯定将来自“美国顺风”。我们很幸运——非常幸运——有这种力量在我们身后。

Over the next 77 years, however, the major source of our gains will almost certainly be provided by The American Tailwind. We are lucky – gloriously lucky – to have that force at our back.

【关注本公众号，在后台回复“巴菲特”，即可获取《致股东信》（英文原版）】

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