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现在两国必须行动，以避免战争。眼下，世界的注意力集中于正在乌克兰上演的可怕战争。在欧洲各国首都，曾被认为是不可能的事——21世纪欧洲大陆大规模战争，如今变得非常真实。在这个严峻时刻，重要的是要冷静地重新评估由当前地缘政治紧张局势可能引发的其他潜在冲突危险。无疑，其中最重要的是美国与中国发生战争的可能性。

若这样的冲突开始，无论是台海危机，还是在南海或任何其他不可预测的爆发点，战争几乎肯定会比我们今天在乌克兰看到的破坏性大很多倍。那将是一场这样的冲突——从海洋到太空的每个地方都升级，并可能卷入世界许多国家。这样的冲突对于美中和我们所有人都将是一场灾难。

美中之间的战争并非不可避免。但美中关系继续螺旋式下降，两国战略关系日渐疏远，并受到日益严重的全球危机的冲击。为避免不知不觉滑入战争，两国须构建一个联合战略框架——即“管控的战略竞争”来维持和平，而且要快。

首先，美中须对彼此不可弱化的战略红线有一个明确、细致的了解，以帮助防止因误判而发生冲突。每一方都必须被说服，并得出结论：提高战略可预测性对两国都有利，战略欺骗是徒劳的，而战略突袭则是非常危险的。

其次，两国都须接受竞争的现实——即把彼此的战略竞争引向提高军事、经济和科技能力的竞争。在适当的限制下，这种竞争可以阻止武装冲突，而不是诱使任何一方冒着一切风险，发动结果无法预测的危险流血战争。这种战略竞争还能使双方在政治、经济和意识形态方面，对世界其他国家的吸引力最大化。

再次，这一框架将为两国继续在国家利益一致的那些领域开展战略合作创造必要的政治空间。这些领域包括：气候变化，防止下一次大流行病，以及维护全球金融稳定。

最后，为使这种关系的界定获得成功前景，它需要双方的内阁级高级官员专门负责，仔细并持续管控。

然而，此类做法在华盛顿和北京都可能面临批评，认为它对双方的国家利益均不够敏感。在华盛顿一些人看来，这会有绥靖的味道——但这是错误的：冷静、现实的威慑是任何对华全面战略的核心。北京的一些人会认为它没充分考虑到中国在台湾问题上的核心利益以及更广泛的民族自豪感。

笔者长期在美国和中国学习、生活，并深深地尊重这两个国家。如果两国发生战争，那将是灾难性的。世界曾经梦游般不知不觉进入一战屠杀，那场战争夺去1500多万人的生命。如今我们已睁大眼睛，若不能避免走进另一场全球灾难，我们将没有任何借口。

The world’s attention is rightly focused on the unfolding horror in Ukraine. Images of destruction and death wrought across that nation, and the harrowing experiences of refugees fleeing in their millions, testify to the tragic reality of war. And in the capitals of Europe, something once thought an impossibility—a large-scale 21st century war on the continent—has now become all too real, awakening once idealistic nations to the hard truth that such senselessness violence has not been eliminated from our modern, globalized world.

The scenes in Kyiv and Mariupol should serve as an abrupt wakeup call to those public figures who have talked loosely about inviting open warfare in our world. Most of them have never seen war themselves, or borne witness to its human cost.

In this grim moment it is important to think through, and coldly reassess the dangers presented by other potential conflicts that could be sparked by today’s geopolitical tensions. The most significant among these is, without doubt, the possibility of a war between the U.S. and China. It is a prospect that we must now acknowledge is no longer unthinkable.

Were such a conflict to begin, whether over a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea, or any number of other unpredictable flashpoints, such a war would almost certainly be many times more destructive than what we are seeing in Ukraine today. It would be a conflict with vast scope for escalation across every domain, from the seas to space, and likely to draw in many other countries across the world, including America’s allies in the Pacific. Such a conflict would be a catastrophe for both countries—and for us all.

War between the United States and China is not inevitable. But U.S.-China relations continue to spiral downward, their strategic relationship adrift and buffeted by growing global crises. Muddling through will be wholly insufficient to avoid conflict. To avoid sleepwalking into a war, both countries must construct a joint strategic framework to maintain the peace—and quickly.

In my new book, The Avoidable War: the Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China, I offer one such framework, which I call “managed strategic competition.” The idea is relatively simple.

First, the United States and China must have a clear, granular understanding of each other’s irreducible strategic redlines in order to help prevent conflict through miscalculation. Each side must be persuaded to conclude that enhancing strategic predictability advantages both countries, strategic deception is futile, and strategic surprise is just plain dangerous. This will require a focused, detailed diplomatic understanding on Taiwan.

Second, both countries must then embrace the reality of their competition—that is, to channel their strategic rivalry into a competitive race to enhance their military, economic, and technological capabilities. Properly constrained, such competition can deter armed conflict rather than tempt either side to risk everything by prosecuting a dangerous and bloody war with unpredictable results. Such strategic competition would also enable both sides to maximize their political, economic, and ideological appeal to the rest of the world. The strategic rationale would be that the most competitive national system would ultimately prevail by becoming (or remaining) the world’s foremost superpower and eventually shaping the world in its image. May the best system win. And I’m confident which one I’d bet on.

Third, this framework would create the political space necessary for the two countries to continue to engage in strategic cooperation in the areas where their national interests align. These spheres include: climate change, preventing the next pandemic, and maintaining global financial stability.

Finally, for this compartmentalization of the relationship to have any prospect for success, it would need to be carefully and continuously managed by a dedicated matching of cabinet-level senior officials on both sides. For the U.S., this also means any such framework would need bipartisan buy-in so it could withstand the turbulence of domestic politics. For a priority this important, this should by no means be impossible.

This approach will face criticism in both Washington and Beijing for not being sufficiently sensitive to each side’s national interests. To some in Washington, it will smack of appeasement. This is false: cold, realistic deterrence is at the core of any comprehensive strategy toward China. Meanwhile many in Beijing will argue it doesn’t sufficiently account for China’s core interests on Taiwan, and broader national pride. But as Moscow just learned in Ukraine, war and economic devastation would suit China’s interests far less.

Ultimately, my challenge to critics of managed strategic competition, and putting guardrails to the U.S.-China relationship, is simple: Come up with something better. There is little time to waste.

I have long studied, lived in, and come to deeply respect both the United States and China. The prospect of war between the two nations would be catastrophic. And, watching the destruction in Ukraine, I cannot help but recall the memory of marching as a small child in our annual ANZAC Day parade—the Australian equivalent of Memorial Day—in our tiny country town with my father, who had fought in World War II, alongside elders who had fought in World War I.

The world managed to sleepwalk into the slaughter of that first Great War, which claimed more than 15 million lives. With our eyes now wide open, we will have no excuse if we fail to avoid walking into yet another global catastrophe today.